given medical malpractice case. For some litigants, this confounding exercise means filing a lawsuit solely to protect the statute of limitations even before the patient or her attorney knows that a claim exists, leaving the litigant to hope that her suspicions of negligence will find support in the evidence. For the more dutiful litigant, any investigation designed to detect or confirm negligence risks a post hoc evaluation of past symptoms, test results, conversations, or diagnoses which, in retrospect, should have led to the discovery of the malpractice. And each time an Indiana court dares attempt to create unity out of the impossibly-inconsistent precedent that came before, a subsequent court tears down the transitory edifice of consensus as quickly as it had been built. This frustrating pattern culminated in late 2009 when the Indiana Court of Appeals forced medical malpractice litigants back to square one on nearly every principle of discovery rule jurisprudence established over the prior decade. This Article tracks the common law evolution of the discovery rule in Indiana's medical malpractice jurisprudence, synthesizes the common law history into a workable framework for future applications of the accrual-based standard, and then explores the Indiana Court of Appeals' unilateral destruction of that framework in the 2009 case ofWilliams v. Adelsperger.
I. INTRODUCTION
For the medical patient suffering the consequences of a physician's error, the world of medicine appears impossibly complex. Facing a field overrun with hyper-technical diagnostic tools and increasingly expensive treatment options, the average layperson has little chance of gauging whether a poor treatment result stems from physician error or some other aspect of treatment. On the one hand. the cautious patient will wish to remain vigilant against unrealistic expectations. On the other hand. to assume infallibility on the part of one's physician discounts one's own suffering while inviting similar harms to the physician's future patients. Thus, the patient must navigate between the Scylla and Charybdis: either act on potentially unfounded suspicion, or risk allowing an act of negligence to go uncompensated and. thus, unpunished.
Complicating this choice, most states have enacted discovery-based statutes of limitations for medical malpractice actions. These statutes are triggered on the date a plaintiff knew, or should have known of, or in other words, discovered the injury and its negligent cause. 1 In Indiana, this standard found voice not in statute itself but in judicial construction. In the landmark case of VanDusen v. Stotts, the Indiana Supreme Court construed Indiana's Medical Malpractice Act to permit medical malpractice victims ''to file their claims within two years of the date when they discover the malpractice and the resulting injury or facts that, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, should lead to the discovery of the malpractice and the resulting injury.',2 With this pronouncement, the Indiana Supreme Court transmuted an occurrence-based statute of limitations into an accrual-based standard.
This accrual-based standard asserted by the Indiana Supreme Court imposed a seemingly impossible challenge on Indiana patients, attorneys, and judges: determine the factor(s) a reviewing court will deem sufficient to trigger the statute of limitations in a given case. For some, this confounding exercise might mean filing a lawsuit solely to protect the statute of limitations even before the patient or her attorney knows that a claim exists, leaving the litigant to hope that her suspicions of negligence will find support in the evidence. For the more dutiful litigant, any investigation (including collection and review of medical records or consultation with other physicians) designed to detect or confirm negligence risks a post hoc evaluation of past symptoms, test results, conversations, or diagnoses which, in retrospect, should have led to the discovery of the malpractice. Now, nearly twelve years after the Indiana Supreme Court announced the accrual-based standard, the waters are no clearer for those maneuvering the medical malpractice shores. Each time an Indiana court attempts to create unity out of the impossibly inconsistent precedent that came before, a subsequent court tears down the transitory edifice of consensus as quickly as it had been built. This frustrating pattern culminated in late 2009 when 1. Nancy Smith, Discovery Date in Medical Malpractice Litigation, in 26 AM. JuR. 3D Proof of Facts § 185 (1994) .
2. VanDusen v. Stotts, 712 N.E.2d 491,497 (Ind. 1999 ) (emphasis added).
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Part II of this article tracks the common law evolution of the discovery of malpractice rule as it pertains to Indiana's medical malpractice statute of limitations. Part III synthesizes the common law history into a workable framework for future applications of the accrual-based standard. Part N explores the Indiana Court of Appeals' unilateral departure from and reimagining of the discovery of malpractice rule in the 2009 case of Williams v. Adelsperger. 3 
II. THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS AND THE DEVEWPMENT OF THE DISCOVERY RULE

A. The Origins of the Medical Malpractice Statute of Limitations
In 1975, Indiana became the first state 4 to pass statutory reform measures to deal with a perceived "health care crisis'.s of rising malpractice insurance costs 6 resulting in reduced availability of services. 7 This crisis allegedly brought on by excessive and unjustifiable malpractice judgments and settlements, a failure to identify habitually negligent health care providers, very large attorney fees, and prolonged time limitations for bringing malpractice actions, 8 prompted the Indiana General Assembly to pass the Medical Malpractice Act. 9 Among the five major provisions contained therein, 10 the Medical Malpractice Act (''the Act") created a two year statute of limitations applicable to all medical malpractice actions: ''No claim, whether in contract or tort, may be brought against a health care provider based upon professional services or health care rendered or that should have been rendered unless filed within two (2) years from the date of the alleged 3. Williams v. Adelsperger, 918 N.E.2d 440,442 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009 ), trans. denied, 929 N.E.2d 788 (Ind. 2010 Accident?, 54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 169, 169 (1991 ) .
5. In re Stephens, 867 N.E.2d 148, 150-51 (Ind. 2007) . 6. H.R. 1460 §l(b), 99th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ind. 1975 ) (''The effect of [increasing] judgments and settlements, base [ d] frequently on legal precedents, have caused the insurance coverage to uniformly and substantially increase the cost of such insurance coverage.").
7. Johnson v. St. Vincent Hosp., Inc., 404 N.E.2d 585,589 (Ind.1980) , abrogated by Collins v. Day, 644 N.E.2d 72 (Ind. 1994) act, omtsston, or neg ect .... Before the passage of the Act, the medical malpractice statute of limitations was treated as "occurrence based" by Indiana courts. This occurrence-based interpretation meant that the occurrence of a negligent act, rather than the discovery of the malpractice and resulting injury, triggered the two-year period. 12 Indeed, the occurrence-based interpretation had prevailed in Indiana since 1941, 13 and subsequent courts continued to apply this approach to the new Act. 14 In 1990, the Indiana Supreme Court confirmed and formally adopted the occurrence-based standard for the Act's statute of limitations. 15 Under the occurrence-based standard, a malpractice victim blind to her physician's malpractice, or the resulting injury, enjoyed only one refuge from the harsh effect of the Act's statute of limitations. The sole refuge was protection in equity from the physician who intentionally concealed, or failed to disclose, relevant information in an effort to hide either the malpractice and/or injury from the patient. 16 In these circumstances, equitable estoppel for fraud would preclude the defendant from asserting the statute of limitations as a defense until the termination of the physician-patient relationship in the case of constructive concealment, 17 or when the "patient learns of the malpractice, or discovers information which would lead to discovery of the malpractice if the patient exercises reasonable diligence," in the case of active concealment, whichever came first. 18 Yet, to be protected in equity under the narrowly-drawn courtesy of fraud protection demanded a near-Herculean showing from the aggrieved victim including: proof of intentional concealment 19 or failure to disclose by the defendant, 20 reliance 11. IND. CoDE § 16-9.5-3-1(a) (1971 ( & Supp. 1976 ) (repealed 1993) (The current statute of limitations is codified in IND. CODE § 34-18-7-1 (b)( 1998). ).
12. Hosp. Corp. of Am. v. Hiland, 547 N.E.2d 869, 872 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989 ), adopted in Cacdac v. Hiland, 561 N.E.2d 758 (Ind. 1990 ); see also Toth v. Lenk:, 330 N.E.2d 336, 338 (Ind. Ct. App. 1975 )(discussing former IND. CODE §34-1-2-5 (1971 [Vol. 8:95 by the plaintiff, ignorance of the fraud by the plaintiff, and an inability to discover the fraud in the exercise of diligence, 21 which required absolute ignorance of any harm or injury and of the malpractice itself. 22 Moreover, a finding of fraudulent concealment would not extend the statute of limitations two full years from the plaintiff's discovery of the malpractice, but rather, would allow the plaintiff only a ''reasonable" time thereafter in which to initiate suit. 23 Even under subsequent amendments and codifications 24 of the Act's statute of limitations, the occurrence-based standard, with its narrow "fraudulent concealment" exception, prevailed until July 1999.
B. Creation of the Discovery Rule
In two separate cases decided on July 8, 1999, the Indiana Supreme Court pronounced its departure from the occurrence-based standard. First/ 5 in Martin v. Richey, 26 the defendant physician failed to correctly diagnose the plaintiff's breast cancer following a needle aspiration, and the defendant further failed to notify the plaintiff that she needed a follow-up excisional biopsy following the needle aspiration?' Three years later, the plaintiff experienced increased pain from the lump in her breast, and a subsequent biopsy revealed adenocarcinoma requiring a radial mastectomy and chemotherapy. 28 The Indiana Supreme Court found the medical malpractice statute of limitations unconstitutional as applied to the plaintiff. First, the statute violated the Indiana Constitution's Privileges and Immunities sician-patient, there exists a duty to disclose material information between the parties and a failure to do so results in concealment").
21. Hughes, 659 N.E.2d at 519; Cacdac v. Hiland, 561 N.E.2d 758, 759 (Ind. 1990) . 24. In 1998, the General Assembly amended and recodified the statute of limitations. IND. CoDE §34-18-7-1(b) (1998) ("A claim, whether in contract or tort, may not be brought against a health care provider based upon professional services or health care that was provided or that should have been provided unless the claim is filed within two (2) years after the date of the alleged act, omission, or neglect .... "). In substance, this version (which remains current as of this writing) is identiCal to the Act's original formulation. Martin v. Richey, 711 N.E.2d 1273 , 1278 n. 6 (Ind. 1999 .
25. Though decided the same day, the Supreme Court considered Martin v. Richey "the lead case" decided that day. VanDusen v. Stotts, 712 N.E.2d 491, 493 (Ind. 1999 Limitations, a 'New' Indiana Constitution and One More Case Pending Decision, REs GESTAE, Nov. 1999 , at 32, 37. 26. Martin, 711 N.E.2d at 1273 . 27. ld. at 1275 . Id. at 1277.
Clause 29 "because it is not 'uniformly applicable' to all medical malpractice victims .... " 30 That is, "the statute precludes [the victim] from pursuing a claim against her doctor because she has a disease which has a long latency period and which may not manifest significant pain or symptoms until several years after the asserted malpractice." 31 Second, the statute violated the Open Courts Clause 32 "because it requires plaintiff to file a claim before she is able to discover the alleged malpractice and her resulting injury, and, therefore, it imposes an impossible condition on her access to the courts and pursuit of her tort remedy." 33 From these rulings, the court did not find that the statute of limitations for medical malpractice claims was unconstitutional in general; rather the court declared the statute of limitations unconstitutional as applied to the plaintiff's situation in which she ''was unaware that she had a malignancy and that the cancer had spread to her lymph nodes" until three years after the negligent failure to diagnose? 4 That same day, in VanDusen v. Stotts, 35 the Indiana Supreme Court expounded upon Martin by purporting to create a framework "to determine how generally to construe or reconstrue the statute of limitations to avoid its unconstitutional application in this case and in future cases." 36 In Van Dusen, the defendant physician "badly misread" a prostate biopsy. 37 More than two years later, the plaintiff began experiencing swelling and pain in his groin and lower back. 38 Follow-up tests revealed incurable prostate cancer. 39 Looking to its line of fraudulent concealment cases, as well as cases construing the general tort and product liability statutes of limitation, the court construed the Act to permit medical malpractice victims ''to file their claims within two years of the date when they discover the malpractice and the resulting injury or facts that, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, should lead to the discovery of the malpractice and the resulting injury.'o4° The Indiana Supreme Court pronounced three principles to help guide the application of this standard. First, "the question of when a plaintiff discovered facts which, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, should lead to the discovery of the medical malpractice and resulting injury, is often a question offact.'o4 1 Second, "a plaintiff's lay suspicion that there may have been malpractice is not sufficient to trigger the two-year period [,] [Vol. 8:95 the same time, a plaintiff need not know with certainty that malpractice caused his injury, to trigger the running of the statutory time period." 42 Finally, "the question may become one of law" where "it is undisputed that plaintiff's doctor has expressly informed a plaintiff that he has a specific injury and that there is a reasonable possibility, if not a probability, that the specific injury was caused by a specific act at a specific time . . ." and in such circumstances, the date the plaintiff receives this information "is the date upon which the two-year period begins to run.'"' 3 Relying on these principles to choose its "trigger date," the court held that the two-year statute of limitations began to run on the date the plaintiff's doctor opined that the biopsy slides might have been misread. 44 In announcing its new construction of the Act's statute of limitations in the Martin and VanDusen cases, the Indiana Supreme Court exposed a litany of questions, the answers to which the court offered only clues. One such question is whether the discovery rule applies only to medical conditions with long latency periods. Undeniably, Martin and Van Dusen each dealt with a plaintiff battling "a disease which has a long latency period and which may not manifest significant pain or symptoms until several years after the asserted malpractice.'"' 5 Yet, the court's analysis in Martin leaves room for the interpretation that the Martin/Van Dusen standard should apply to all medical conditions, not merely the ones with a long latency period. Specifically, in discussing the Privileges and Immunities Clause, the Martin court is explicit in its concern over diseases with long latency periods by defining the subclass of citizens subject to disparate treatment as those with "a disease which may not manifest significant pain or debilitating symptoms until several years after the initial diagnosis or misdiagnosis.'"'6 Yet, the discussion in Martin ofthe Open Courts Clause invokes no such reliance on long latency periods or the manifestation of pain or symptoms. Instead, this portion of the court's analysis seems to apply more broadly, emphasizing the ''plaintiff [who] has no meaningful opportunity to file an otherwise valid tort claim within the specified statutory time period because, given the nature of the asserted malpractice and the resulting injury or medical condition, plaintiff is unable to discover that she has a cause [Vol. 8:95 date of the plaintiff's actual knowledge rather than the date on which the plaintiff "experienced increased pain from the lump in her breast and under her right arm," 52 and the Van Dusen court chose not to select the date on which plaintiff experienced pain and swelling in the affected area or the date on which the plaintiff realized pain medication was not improving his symptoms. 53 Likewise, Van Dusen seems to suggest that in a failure-todiagnose case, the date of a correct diagnosis from a subsequent physician would not serve as a trigger date. Of the multiple events that occurred on the trigger date in VanDusen, the court did not rely on it being the date a doctor told the plaintiff he had incurable prostate cancer; nor did the court rely on it being the date plaintiff suspected malpractice such that he asked if the biopsy slides had been misread. 54 Beyond these (vague) clues, however, litigants would have to wait for further explanation and guidance.
What Does "Reasonable Diligence" Mean?
Another question brought about by and not answered by the Martin and Van Dusen decisions is the definition of ''reasonable diligence." Is "in the exercise of reasonable diligence" 55 intended as a hypothetical construct (i.e., the court can envision a hypothetical scenario in which a plaintiff might discover the malpractice and resulting injury after conducting an imaginary investigation), or does this clause create a separate requirement of diligent investigation for plaintiffs? If the latter, then what of the plaintiff who does conduct an investigation yet still fails to discover the malpractice and resulting injury? The court provided no standard for what type of investigation would be diligent and what factors would make an investigation fall short ofbeing diligent.
When Is the Trigger Date Determination a Question of Fact, and When Is It a Question of Law?
In announcing that ''the question of when a plaintiff discovered facts which, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, should lead to the discovery of the medical malpractice and resulting injury, is often a question of fact," 56 the VanDusen Court offered little guidance or explanation as to what "often" means, aside from a declaration that the trigger date inquiry "may become one of law" where physician input reveals "a reasonable possibility, if not a probability, that the specific injury was caused by a specific Related to the prior questio~ the Martin and Van Dusen courts offered no guidance or explanation as to how the questions of fact surrounding the trigger date should be resolved. Likewise, these decisions did not clarify whether the determination of what .. reasonable diligence" should uncover was to be made by a court or by a fact-finder. Litigants would have to wait almost a full decade before receiving an answer to this question. 58 C. Developing the Standard (1999 -2005 The Indiana Supreme Court's next three pronouncements offered little guidance on how to apply the Martin/Van Dusen standard. Only two months after the Martin and Van Dusen decisions, the court, in Harris v. Raymond, 59 ruled that a plaintiff's malpractice action filed after the statutory period against a dentist for "failure to warn" had been timely. In so holding, though it did not specify a precise event, the court implied that the trigger date occurred during a two-month window when the plaintiff consulted a doctor for bleeding in her ear, had a piece of the defective implant removed from her head, discovered that the implant had shattered, and discovered that the FDA had issued a safety alert regarding the implant. 60 Of particular interest is the fact that, though the court expressly invoked Martin as the basis for its result, the court neither mentioned nor discussed whether a defective implant qualified as a condition with a .. long latency period." Instead, the Harris court observed that the plaintiff "could not have discovered the alleged negligence within the statutory period, and to apply the statute of limitations would force her to bring a claim before she knew or reasonably could have known of the existence of such claim.'o6 1 Thereafter in Halbe v. Weinberg, 62 a plurality of the Indiana Supreme Court determined that even though the plaintiff ''may have suspected something was amiss" when she experienced nipple discharge, she did not have .. any reason whatsoever to suspect she bad a cause of action against her doctor" prior to collecting her own medical records and discovering that her implants contained silicone rather than saline. 63 The court appeared to place no significance on the four-year interval between manifestation of [Vol. 8:95 symptoms and the plaintiff's investigation into her medical records, 64 and the court again omitted any discussion of whether breast implants causing nipple discharge qualify as a condition with a "long latency period." Interestingly, the plurality seemed to acknowledge (without holding or deciding) that the equitable remedy available for fraudulent concealment remained available to medical malpractice litigants, 65 a curious supposition given that the discovery rule would seem to subsume any need for separate inquiry into fraudulent concealment. 66 The following year, the Indiana Supreme Court, in Boggs v. Tri-State Radiology, Inc., 61 addressed a situation where the trigger date occurred thirteen months after the date of malpractice, yet the plaintiff waited another twenty-two and one-half months before initiating suit. 68 In a 3-2 majority opinion, the court upheld the trial court's dismissal of the action, holding that an eleven-month window (between the trigger and the expiration of the limitations period two years after the act of malpractice) did not shorten the limitations period "so unreasonably that it is impractical for a plaintiff to file a claim at all.'o6 9 Though the majority opinion appeared to equate the date of a biopsy revealing malignancy with the plaintiff's "knowledge of facts that led to the discovery of alleged malpractice," 70 the court neither discussed nor analyzed its reasons for selecting that particular trigger date, and only a bare-bones factual background is given bereft of reference to that plaintiff's manifestation of symptoms, suspicions, or conversations with physicians. 71 Over the next two years, the court of appeals applied the Martin/Van Dusen standard to determine trigger dates in several cases, each time wrestling with unanswered questions left by the Martin and Van Dusen courts. [T]he discussion in Boggs summarily referred to a plaintiff's discovery of injury without any specific reference to the discovery of the malpractice itself, or facts that in the exercise of reasonable diligence should lead to the discovery of the malpractice. This observation, however, did not represent a retreat from the rule of Martin and Van Dusen that the discovery date is triggered when a plaintiff either (l) knows of the malpractice and resulting injury or (2) For example, in three separate cases decided during this span, the court of appeals selected trigger dates based on the date a plaintiff learned (from a subsequent physician) of a prior misdiagnosis, not the date on which symptoms first appeared or worsened. 72 Likewise, these decisions implicitly reject trigger dates based upon the mere receipt of a correct diagnosis unless that diagnosis is combined with additional information signaling prior error.73 Furthermore, the court of appeals emphasized repeatedly that mere knowledge of the ultimate injury, standing alone, is insufficient to trigger a discovery date. 74 In its 2001 Rogers v. Mendel decision, the court of appeals announced for the first time that where the facts surrounding a trigger date determination are in dispute, ''the judge will be required to resolve disputed facts through pre-trial motion practice ... :m Moreover, in Shah v.
Harris, the court of appeals explicitly rejected any suggestion that the Martin/Van Dusen standard applied only in the context of conditions with "long latency" periods. 76 In early 2002, however, two court of appeals decisions appeared to signal a partial retreat from these prior cases by emphasizing symptomatology over physician input. In Johnson v. Gupta, the court of appeals reinterpreted Martin and Van Dusen to apply only where a plaintiff suffers no discernible symptoms within two years of the date of malpractice. 77 Yet even under this new interpretation, the court of appeals did not select as its trigger the date on which Johnson first "knew there was something wrong,'' [ Vol. 8:95 the date she first experienced fecal incontinence, or even the date she decided to seek a second opinion; 78 rather, the court of appeals selected the date on which a subsequent doctor told her "that her incontinence was caused by a complete lack of rectal tone." 79 As the Supreme Court would later explain, "the Gupta court expressly recognized that the occurrence-based statute of limitations does not apply 'in cases where the patient does not suffer symptoms that put the patient on notice that something may have gone wrong in the course of medical treatment "' 80 The following month, Langman v. Milos again mentioned worsening symptoms while (arguably) relying on other factors. 81 In Langman, the plaintiff suffered increased pain following podiatric surgery, and be opined to his physician that the surgery bad made his condition worse. 82 Nevertheless, the plaintiff discontinued treatment, and refused to follow any recommendations or referrals prescribed by another physician. 83 Rather, the plaintiff abstained from all medical treatment for two and a half years despite worsening symptoms. 84 From this, the court of appeals concluded (without selecting a specific trigger and without identifying a dispositive factor) that "[w]ithin two years of his surgery, and clearly within two years of his last visit to [his physician]," the plaintiff "had enough information that a reasonably diligent person should have discovered the alleged malpractice claim .... " 8 s Though Langman might be read for the proposition that worsening symptomatology alone may be sufficient to serve as a trigger, it seems equally, if not more, plausible to read Langman as the first post-Martin/Van Dusen examination of "reasonable diligence," i.e., that "reasonable diligence" is absent as a matter of law where a plaintiff abandons medical treatment altogether for two and a half years despite worsening symptoms.
Just three months later, a different panel of the court of appeals returned to the pre-Gupta/Langman line of thought Thereafter, an August ·1999 ultrasound revealed a large malignant tumor at which time plaintiff was diagnosed with cervical cancer and, as a result, underwent a radical hysterectomy. 89 Following the surgery, plaintiff became curious as to why the results of her previous PAP smears had been negative given how quickly her tumor had developed. After collecting her own medical records, she asked a cytotechnologist to review the slides from the prior PAP smears "to see if anything may have been missed. " 90 The cytotechnologist indicated that some of the slides might have been misread-a conclusion confirmed by a pathologist in April2000. 91 In a confusing opinion, the Jacobs Court initially flirted with the idea that the plaintiff's August 1999 diagnosis of cervical cancer should act as the appropriate trigger, presumably because that was the ''trigger date" arrived at by the trial court. 92 The court of appeals eventually concluded that even assuming this earliest possible trigger date, the six months remaining in the initial two-year statute of limitations was insufficient as a matter of law to afford plaintiff a meaningful opportunity to pursue her malpractice claim. 93 Yet, before reaching that conclusion, the court of appeals established a range of time in which the actual trigger would have occurred.
Painting the earliest possible edge of the range, the court of appeals observed that "[ o ]nly after being diagnosed with cervical cancer and learning of the advanced stage of the disease did [the plaintift] possess information which would even give rise to the 'suspicion or speculation of malpractice by a plaintiff who is without technical or medical knowledge"'-a "suspicion or speculation" which the court of appeals acknowledged would be insufficient by itself to serve as a triggering event. 94 Locating the latest possible edge of the range, the court of appeals noted that the April 2000 pathologisfs report gave the plaintiffs "more information than they needed to put them on notice that there was a reasonable possibility [of malpractice] and that there was a need to investigate :further." 95 Apparently settling on the latter date as the appropriate trigger, the court of appeals observed: App. 2002) , the court of appeals held that vaginal swelling and discomfort almost immediately after surgery was sufficient to serve as a trigger in the fraudulent concealment context. In dissent, Judge Vaidik rejected the symptoms-as-trigger approach and instead concluded that the plaintiff "did not have adequate infonnation that would have led to the discovery of the malpractice" until she collected her own medical records and learned that her physician had operated on the affected area. Schopp, 780 N.E.2d at 1212 (Vaidik, J., dissenting). Thereafter, two Justices on the Supreme Court voted in favor of transfer. 792 N.E.2d 44 ( Wiley, defendants recommended and performed Lasik surgery on a patient with a history of glaucoma and cataracts. 99 The surgery required multiple revisions and eventually resulted in permanent vision loss. 100 Because plaintiff suffered from problems almost immediately following the surgeries, defendants argued that the plaintiff should have discovered the malpractice within two years. 101 Reversing the trial court's grant of summary judgment, the Supreme Court first synthesized its prior holdings into a methodology to guide application of the Act's statute of limitations:
Initially, a court must determine the date the alleged malpractice occurred and determine the discovery date--the date when the claimant discovered the alleged malpractice and resulting injury, or possessed enough information that would have led a reasonably diligent person to make such discovery. If the discovery date is more than two years beyond the date the malpractice occurred, the claimant has two years after discovery within which to initiate a malpractice action. But if the discovery date is within two years following the occurrence of the alleged malpractice, the statutory limitation period applies and the action must be initiated before the period expires, unless it is not reasonably possible for the claimant to present the claim in the time remaining after discovery and before the end of the statutory period. 102 Turning next to the facts of the case at bar, the Booth Court distinguished between knowledge of injury and knowledge of potential malpractice in selecting a trigger date:
While the facts stressed by the defendants in the present case demonstrate that Mr. Booth had knowledge within the period prescribed by the statute of limitations that he had serious vision problems and probable permanent vision impairment, they do not necessarily establish as an undisputed issue of fact that this amounts to discovery of "facts which, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, should lead to the 99. Booth v. Wiley, 839 N.E.2d 1168 , 1173 (Ind 2005 Instead, the Court selected as its trigger the date when another physician advised the plaintiff"that the Lasik surgery should not have been performed because of his preexisting cataracts and glaucoma." 104 In so holding, the Booth majority implicitly confirmed the importance of physician input in selecting a trigger date, while, at the same time, discounting the significance of symptom manifestation. Yet, the Court cautioned against reading its decision as "holding that an expert's advice is always required to put a patient on notice that problems may be due to malpractice." 105 Instead, the majority opined (without further explanation or example) that the requisite facts might in some circumstances "arise from a patient's ordinary experiences and observations ... . '' 106 Following the Booth Court's implicit affirmation that "symptoms aren't enough," the court of appeals again fell in line, reaffirming the importance of physician input in calculating a trigger. 107 For example, in the 2006 Battema v. Booth decision, the court of appeals reversed the trial court's grant of summary judgment. Rejecting the contention that postsurgical scarring was a sufficient trigger, the Court instead emphasized the fact that no subsequent physician had opined to plaintiff that her procedure had been performed negligently. 108 Instead, "Battema was aware of an 'unfortunate result' shortly after the procedure performed by Dr. Sally, but she was not necessarily aware that the scarring could have been caused by malpractice until she found out that Dr. Sally was a recovering narcotics addict and had experienced a relapse around the time of the procedure." 109 Likewise, in Palmer v. Gorecki, 110 the defendant physician misread the plaintiff's echocardiogram, erroneously diagnosed the plaintiff with endocarditis, and initiated a course of antibiotic treatment that resulted in nausea, dizziness, imbalance, and eventual hospitalization. 111 The court of appeals held that the plaintiff in that case "reasonably should have known 103 of the alleged malpractice" eight months after the misreading of the echocardiogram, when a subsequent physician informed him "'there was no current evidence for active endocarditis. "' 112 The court of appeals did not select the date the plaintiff first experienced adverse symptoms from the antibiotic treatments, the date of his hospitalization from those symptoms, or even the date another physician concluded that the plaintiff's "symptoms were directly related to toxic effects of the antibiotic therapy," and correctly diagnosed the plaintiff with vestibular toxicity. 113
E. The 2008 Trio ofSupreme Court Decisions
In 2008, the Supreme Court issued three separate decisions, one by unanimous decision, and two by plurality, which both clarified and (potentially) destroyed many of the principles solidified by the prior nine years of appellate court decisions. Yet, before the dust from this upheaval could settle, the Court managed to resolve the issues in each of the three cases without necessitating any significant departure from precedent.
Brinkman v. Bueter
In Brinkman v. Bueter, 114 the plaintiff suffered from significant headaches and seizures that required emergency hospitalization in the days following the birth of plaintiff's first child. 115 Plaintiff's obstetrician diagnosed her with preeclampsia, a pregnancy-related medical condition, which, if left untreated, could develop into eclampsia with associated convulsions and eventual coma. 116 Though preeclampsia typically develops after the twentieth week of pregnancy, 117 the defendant obstetrician convinced plaintiff that her situation was "atypical . 124. !d. at 497 (requiring plaintiffs "to file their claims within two years of the date when they discover the malpractice and the resulting injury or facts that, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, should lead to the discovery of the malpractice and the resulting injury") (emphasis added).
125. See Booth v. Wiley, 839 N.E.2d 1168 , 1175 (Ind. 2005 (distinguishing between knowledge of injury and knowledge of potential malpractice in selecting a trigger date: "While the facts stressed by the defendants in the present case demonstrate that Mr. Booth had knowledge within the period prescribed by the statute of limitations that he had serious vision problems and probable permanent vision impairment, they do not necessarily establish as an undisputed issue of fact that this amounts to discovery of 'facts which, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, should lead to the discovery of the medical malpractice."'). 117 standard, the Brinkman Court continued its onslaught on precedent by reviving the debate as to whether the objective standard should apply only in cases involving asymptomatic latency periods. Noting that both Martin and VanDusen involved the failure to diagnose cancer and the impossibility of plaintiffs bringing such claims "before they know they are suffering from the disease," 126 the Court stopped short of issuing any declaration regarding the latency issue, noting only that "[t]he Brinkmans did not face this challenge."127 Instead, the Brinkman Court found that the plaintiff should have been aware of the negligent failure to diagnose preeclampsia as soon as she "suffered eclamptic seizures" and ''was immediately diagnosed with and treated for eclampsia." 128 By itself, this conclusion implies that the onset of symptoms, either alone or combined with the receipt of a correct diagnosis, is sufficient to serve as a discovery date trigger. But rather than concede that Brinkman damages the long line of prior cases (including, once again, Booth) which rejected the symptoms-as-trigger approach, a more nuanced reading suggests that in actuality, symptomatology did not inform the Court's decision. Note that the Court selected the date of the seizure, hospitalization, and diagnosis as its discovery date, rather than the eight-dayprior hospitalization for severe headaches "unlike any headache in the past," the three-day-prior development of neck pain, the two-day-prior recurrence of headaches, or the recurrence of nausea and vomiting without any relief from medication. 129 Thus, notwithstanding the dicta contained therein and, assuming the Court did not intend a distinction between various types of symptoms (e.g., those which require hospitalization and those which do not), the result in Brinkman could be read as consistent with Martin, Van Dusen, Booth, and the numerous court of appeals decisions interpreting those cases. Therefore, the Brinkman decision could be interpreted to hold that the appearance or progression of symptoms is not sufficient to serve as a discovery date trigger unless accompanied by a specific diagnosis, one which by itself signals the likely presence of a prior, undiagnosed condition. 130
Overton v. Grillo
Implicitly confirming this reading of Brinkman, the Indiana Supreme 126. Brinkman v. Bueter, 879 N.E.2d 549, 554 (Ind. 2008 [ Vol. 8:95 Court again considered ''trigger dates" in Overton v. Grillo 131 wherein the plurality 132 addressed yet another case of a plaintiff discovering metastasized cancer shortly after a misread mammogram. In Overton, the plaintiff discovered a lump in her right breast fifteen months after the defendant physician reported plaintiff's mammogram as normal. 133 An ultrasound and biopsy performed the following week revealed carcinoma of the right breast that had metastasized to the lymph nodes. 134 Following radiation and chemotherapy, the plaintiff first learned of the possibility of malpractice in a meeting with her attorney one year after discovering the lump in her breast. 135 Perhaps following Brinkman's lead, the plurality crafted another opinion that, if taken at face value, would rewrite the entirety of discovery rule jurisprudence since the incipiency of the Martin/Van Dusen standard. Writing for the plurality, Justice Boehm first compared Overton to the Court's 2000 decision in Boggs. 136 From this comparison, Justice Boehm concluded that " [b ] oth Mrs. Boggs and Mrs. Overton knew of their condition and that they had not been previously diagnosed. That is enough to put the plaintiff on inquiry notice of the possibility of malpractice .... " 137 This statement appears to impose an "inquiry notice" requirement on medical malpractice victims based on nothing more than the mere receipt of a diagnosis. In dissent, Justices Dickson and Rucker correctly observed that "[a ]n injured plaintiff is not required to suspect, investigate, or commence litigation unless the facts known are sufficiently significant as to create a reasonable probability that malpractice had occurred." 138 The dissenting Justices further cautioned against any rule of law which would hinge on "inquiry notice ofthe possibility of malpractice" as any such·rule would "impose on injured patients an obligation of suspicious investigation never envisioned by Booth, and [would be] contrary to its express holding. " 139 Yet in the following paragraph, the Overton plurality offers a further explanation for its decision, which appears to rescue both Overton and 131. Overton v. Grillo, 896 N.E.2d 499 (Ind. 2008 ger date not when plaintiff began having eye problems because his doctors "continued to present other explanations for the vision difficulties" without mentioning the alleged act of malpractice as a potential cause). 144 Of course, the discerning reader will recall that no such emphasis on "alternative explanations" appeared in the Booth majority opinion. 145 In fact, the quotation offered by Justice Boehm actually comes from a summary of the plaintiff's argument on transfer and not from any analysis by the Booth majority.146 Nevertheless, Justice Boehm's rewriting of precedent arguably invites an "alternative explanations" exception to the discovery rule, one that is similar in substance and effect to the doctrine of fraudulent concealment yet requiring no evidence of fraudulent intent. 
Herron v. Anigbo
The same day 147 as its decision in Overton, the same plurality of the Supreme Court in Herron v. Anigbo 148 attempted to synthesize the state of the law regarding trigger dates. In Herron, the plaintiff sustained a fall at his home that rendered him quadriplegic. 149 The following day, the defendant physician performed spinal surgery including placement of a bone graft and plate for purposes of a failed cervical fusion. 150 Thereafter, the plaintiff remained in hospitals and care facilities during which he had difficulty speaking, suffered from infection and pulmonary difficulties, and even required the use of a ventilator for nine months. 151 Fifteen months later, a subsequent physician notified plaintiff that he "may well require revision surgery" and recommended more tests. 152 Five months thereafter, another physician notified plaintiff that his deteriorating condition was likely caused by negligent follow-up care. 153 Following another surgery and hospital stay during which he was confmed to a halo, the plaintiff initiated suit against the defendant physician on December 7, 2004, a full thirty-three months after his initial surgery. 154 After reciting the objective standard and reiterating the distinction between triggers that occur before and after the initial two-year window closes, the Herron plurality, again led by Justice Boehm, examined "reasonable diligence." 155 Noting that ''the critical issue is what reasonable diligence requires, not when the claim accrues or is discovered," Justice Boehm explained: "[R]easonable diligence requires more than inaction by a patient who, before the statute has expired, does or should know of both the injury or disease and the treatment that either caused or failed to identify or improve it, even if there is no reason to suspect malpractice." 156 Note Justice Boehm's subtle expansion of the discovery rule, announcing for the first time, with neither discussion nor citation to authority, that the knowledgeof-malpractice prong may be satisfied by mere awareness that one's medical treatment has failed to improve a medical condition. 157 The plurality 147. As it had done with the release of its Martin and VanDusen opinions, the Supreme Court issued Overton and Herron on the same day. Yet, as with VanDusen nine years before, Herron appears in a later volume of the North Eastern Reporter Second than its companion decision. See supra note 25. then summarized its rationale in Brinkman as ' '[t] he eclampsia brought to light the potential of the preeclampsia," 158 and it was stated in Martin that '"the limitations period started when breast cancer was identified, because the patient was in a position to uncover the failure to identify it in an earlier mammogram .... " 159
With that, the Herron plurality then turned to the question of whether «reasonable diligence" is to be decided as a question of law or a question of fact. 160 The plurality concluded that the '<trigger date will be tolled as a matter of law when the alleged malpractice was not reasonably discoverable within the limitations period" such as where ''[t]he disease or injury remains latent for an extended period after the alleged malpractice." 161 Absent such circumstances however, "factual issues relating to the running of the limitations period, such as the date on which the plaintiff first learns of the injury, are to be resolved by the trier of fact at trial." 162 The plurality identified "[r]eliance on a medical professional's words or actions that deflect inquiry into potential malpractice" and .. explicit or implicit denial of causation [by a physician]" as examples of such factual issues requiring resolution at trial.163 Likewise, .. [t]he physical incapacity of the plaintiff can in limited circumstances constitute [another] ground for tolling the statute of limitations period," 164 a situation which, like reliance on a medical professional who deflects inquiry, .. ultimately turns on an issue of fact." 165 Then, in a departure from at least three prior court of appeals decisions, 166 the Herron plurality announced that "factual issues relating to the running of the limitations period, such as the date on which the plaintiff first learns of the injury, are to be resolved by the trier of fact at trial." 167
With the foregoing framework established, the Herron plurality conrest or cure a known progressive condition such as the degenerative eye condition in Booth."
!d. at 448. The ad hoc revisions to the Booth holding seem to stem more from an aversion to overruling precedent than from fealty to the actual text of the decision. See Booth v. Wiley, 839 N.E.2d 1168, 1173-74 (malpractice was performance ofill-advised Lasik surgery on a less-than-ideal candidate with preexisting conditions which resulted in permanent vision loss, not failure to improve a progressive condition. [Vol. 8:95 eluded that because the plaintiff remained hospitalized following his cervical fusion surgery and the only evidence offered regarding his failure to investigate for potential malpractice was that the "extent of injuries was not made known to me at that time," 168 the plaintiff's claim, filed thirty-three months post-surgery, was untimely. 169 From the foregoing history, the following principles emerge:
A. The Objective Standard Remains Unchanged
Notwithstanding the potential damage inflicted on the Martin/Van Dusen standard by careless wording and dicta in the Indiana Supreme Court's 2008 trio of decisions, the core of the objective standard remains intact:
[W]here the constitutionality of the occurrence-based limitations period as applied to a given case is in issue, the ultimate question becomes the time at which a patient "either (1) knows of the malpractice andresulting injury or (2) learns of facts that, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, should lead to the discovery of the malpractice and the resulting injury." 171 For each of these two scenarios, discovery of the "malpractice" and discovery of the "resulting injury'' remain dual requirements stated in the conjunctive. Though the Brinkman court phrased the standard as to imply that discovery of an injury alone, without reference to discovery of malpractice, is the operative trigger, such an interpretation would directly contradict both the VanDusen court's original formulation of the discovery rule 172 448-49 (quoting Booth v. W'tley, 839 N.E.2d 1168 , 1172 (Ind. 2005 ). 172. VanDusen v. Stotts, 712 N.E.2d 491, 497 (Ind. 1999 ) (requiring plaintiffs "to file their claims within two years of the date when they discover the malpractice and the resulting injury or facts that, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, should lead to the discovery of the malpractice and the resulting injury") (emphasis added).
173. See Booth, 839 N.E.2d at 1175 (distinguishing between knowledge of injury and knowledge of potential malpractice in selecting a trigger date: ''While the facts stressed by pears likely that any challenge to the objective standard implicit in the Brinkman decision stems from poor word choice rather than the intent of the opinion's signatories.
Moreover, the inquiry into whether certain facts should lead to discovery, as opposed to whether those facts raise the mere possibility of discovery, remains inviolate. Of the three cases potentially challenging this interpretation, two cases, Overton and Herron, are non-precedential plurality decisions. 174 As for the third case, Brinkman, the court's declaration that the statutory period will begin to run when ''the patient has sufficient facts to make it possible to discover the alleged injury'' 175 is, as before, more likely the product of careless wording than an intent to overhaul the Martin/Van Dusen standard, particularly in light of Justices Rucker's and Dickson's vehement opposition to any rule of law which would hinge on "inquiry notice of the possibility ofmalpractice." 176
B. Questions of Fact vs. Questions of Law
Combining the Indiana Supreme Court's reasoning in VanDusen v. Stotts and Herron v. Anigbo, the following approach to this issue emerges: " [T] he question of when a plaintiff discovered facts which, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, should lead to the discovery of the medical malpractice and resulting injury, is often a question of fact." 177 Examples of "issues of fact" include ''the date on which the plaintiff first learns of the injury;" 178 "[r]eliance on a medical professional's words or actions that deflect inquiry into potential malpractice;" 179 ''explicit or implicit denial of causation [by a physician];" 180 and " [t] he physical incapacity of the plaintiff."181 Examples of "questions of law" include situations where "it is undisputed that plaintiff's doctor has expressly informed a plaintiff that he has a specific injury and that there is a reasonable possibility, if not a probability, that the specific injury was caused by a specific act at a specific time .. the defendants in the present case demonstrate that Mr. Booth had knowledge within the period prescribed by the statute of limitations that he had serious vision problems and probable permanent vision impairment, they do not necessarily establish as an undisputed issue of fact that this amounts to discovery of 'facts which, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, should lead to the discovery of the medical malpractice."'). 
C. How the Discovery Date Affects the Limitations Period
If the trigger date falls after the original two-year period expires, beginning from the date of malpractice, then the plaintiff has two years from the trigger date in which to initiate his or her action. 186 If the trigger date falls within the original two-year period, then the plaintiff must initiate suit before the expiration of the original two-year period if reasonable in the exercise of due diligence. 187 If inadequate time remains in the original twoyear period to initiate suit, then the plaintiff is afforded "reasonable time" after the trigger date to proceed. 188 The amount of time that qualifies as adequate or reasonable remains undefined, but a plurality of the Indiana Supreme Court has held four months to be "sufficient time to get a claim on file . Further bolstering this conclusion, the plurality in Herron implicitly confirmed that the trigger date analysis may take place absent a medical condition with a long latency period. Supplementing the guidelines as to what qualifies determination as a matter of law, the Herron opinion concluded that the ''trigger date will be tolled as a matter of law when the al-190. At least one commentator raised this concern at the time the court released the As the Indiana Supreme Court declared during its first pronouncement of the discovery rule, "a plaintiffs lay suspicion that there may have been malpractice is not sufficient to trigger the two-year period." 199 Following this guidance, not once from the years 1999 through 2008 did any Indiana court place any weight on a plaintiff's lay suspicion regarding the possibility of malpractice when determining a trigger date. Indeed, this result is unsurprising given the conceptual disconnect between a plaintiff's subjective thoughts, feelings, or beliefs, and the inherently objective inquiry at the heart of the Martin/Van Dusen standard 200 Moreover, the Herron plurality, perhaps unintentionally, indirectly confirmed that lay suspicion cannot serve as a trigger. In Herron, the Indi- logical impossibility for lay suspicion to play any role in the trigger date analysis. Consider, in order for a plaintiff to conduct an investigation into whether her physician might have committed malpractice, that plaintiff must harbor some suspicion that her physician has done something wrong. Without suspicion, there is no reason to investigate, and to require diligent investigation absent suspicion is to put the proverbial cart before the horse. Yet, if suspicion is to serve as a trigger, then the added "reasonable diligence" requirement becomes meaningless. Once the suspicion triggers the statute of limitations, there is nothing to be gained by inquiring into whether the plaintiff engaged in a diligent investigation; the bell has already been rung. Therefore, "lay suspicion" and "reasonable diligence" cannot coexist logically in the trigger date inquiry. When the Indiana Supreme Court decrees the latter, it necessarily vitiates the former.
F. Worsening Symptoms vs. Physician Notification of Probable Malpractice
From the years 1999 through 2007, the Indiana Court of Appeals and Indiana Supreme Court repeatedly reaff'mned the importance of physician input in calculating a trigger date and routinely rejected any attempt to base a trigger date on manifestation or worsening of symptoms. 202 Indeed, even those decisions that purported to rely on symptomatology in selecting a trigger date actually required more. 203 202. See supra Part I.C, discussing Moyer v. Three Unnamed Physicians from Marion County, 845 N.E.2d 252, 257-59 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (trigger occurred when physician informed plaintiff of possible link between Accutane and heart disease-court rejected earlier dates of heart disease diagnosis and open-heart surgery); Burns v. Hatchett, 786 N.E.2d 1178 , 1181 & n. 2 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003 , trans. denied (assuming that date the subsequent physician "told [plaintifi] she had TMJ and that she had a 'clear case of malpractice' against [defendant]" served as trigger); Dorman v. Osmose, Inc., 782 N.E.2d 463, 467-69 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) , trans. denied (plaintiff's lay suspicion combined with ongoing symptoms over four years insufficient; statute did not begin to run until physician report connecting illness to treated wood); Jacobs v. Manhart, 770 N.E.2d 344, 347 & 354 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) , reh'g denied, abrogated on other grounds by Herron, 897 N.E.2d 444 (date pathologist confirmed that some slides had been misread chosen as "trigger"). See also Booth v. Wiley, 839 N.E.2d 1168 , 1175 (Ind. 2005 ) (knowledge of"serious vision problems and probable permanent vision impairment" insufficient; rather, date physician opined ''that the Lasik surgery should not have been performed because of his preexisting cataracts and glaucoma" served as trigger); Van Dusen, 712 N.E.2d at 494, 499-500 (of multiple events which occurred on trigger date, court did not rely on it being date doctor diagnosed incurable prostate cancer; nor did court rely on it being date plaintiff voiced suspicion of malpractice; rather, court relied on it being date on which doctor opined that biopsy slides may have been misread).
203. See supra Part I.C, discussing Langman v. Milos, 765 N.E.2d 227, 236 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) , abrogated by Herron, 891 N.E.2d 444 (emphasizing plaintiff's lack of reasonable diligence); Johnson v. Gupta, 762 N.E.2d 1280 , 1282 -83 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002 (selecting date of physician input as trigger rather than date plaintiff first "knew there was something wrong," date she first experienced fecal incontinence, or even the date she decided to seek a second opinion). [Vol. 8:95 Finally resolving the issue in the year 2005, the Indiana Supreme Court in Booth confirmed the disconnect between knowledge of serious or worsening symptoms and knowledge of"facts which, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, should lead to the discovery of the medical malpractice."204 Though the Booth court cautioned against reading its decision as "holding that an expert's advice is always required to put a patient on notice that problems may be due to malpractice," the court offered no guidance as to when "a patient's ordinary experiences and observations" might supply the necessary information for a malpractice claim. 205 Indeed, this emphasis on physician input persists under the Indiana Supreme Court's subsequent attempts tore-frame the standards from the Martin and VanDusen cases. 206
G. Discovery of Injury and Receipt of Correct Diagnosis Insufficient (Usually)
The VanDusen court's original formulation of the discovery rule 207 and the court's analysis in Boot~0 8 combine to confmn that discovery of injury is but one prong of a two-pronged standard. Knowledge of injury alone is insufficient to serve as a discovery date trigger.
However, because of imprecise language in Boggs, 209 one might perceive an exception carved out of this rule specific to failure-to-diagnose cases-that the mere receipt of a correct diagnosis, standing alone, could be a discovery date trigger. Though the Indiana Supreme Court explicitly rejected such a reading, 210 later opinions by the court might be read to fuel the fire started by Boggs? 11 Thus, the medical malpractice litigant in Indiana is left to ponder the effect of these later Indiana Supreme Court decisions: did the court intend to carve out an exception to the two-pronged standard specific to failure-to-diagnose cases (and in direct opposition to its rejection of 204 . Booth, at 839 N.E.2d at 1177 . 205. Id. at 1176 . See Herron, 897 N.E.2d at 453 (assuming "trigger date" when plaintiff "was informed of the potential of malpractice" by subsequent physician).
207. VanDusen v. Stotts, 712 N.E.2d 491, 497 (Ind. 1999) (requiring plaintiffs "to file their claims within two years of the date when they discover the malpractice and the resulting injury or facts that, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, should lead to the discovery of the malpractice and the resulting injury'') (emphasis added).
208. See Booth, 839 N.E.2d at 1175 (distinguishing between knowledge of injury and knowledge of potential malpractice in selecting a trigger date).
209. See discussion supra Part I.C; see also supra note 71 (discussing Boggs v. TriState Radiology, Inc., 730 N.E.2d 692 (Ind. 2000) ).
210. Booth, 839 N.E.2d at 1172. 211. See Overton v. Grillo, 896 N.E.2d 499, 503 (Ind. 2008 ) (suggesting that knowledge of metastasized cancer combined with absence of prior diagnosis sufficient to put plaintiff on "inquiry notice" of failure to diagnose cancer); Brinkman v. Bueter, 879 N.E.2d 549, 554-55 (Ind. 2008 ) (implying that onset of symptoms, either standing alone or combined with diagnosis of eclampsia, is a sufficient trigger for failure to diagnose preeclampsia). [Vol. 8:95 2005. 
B. The Court's Analysis
Affirming the trial court's grant of summary judgment to Dr. Adelsperger, the court of appeals in Williams v. Ade/sperger adopted a scattershot approach to judicial review by blindly throwing several justifications for its decision against the wall in the hopes that one or more might stick. Unfortunately for future medical malpractice litigants in Indiana, none do.
After summarizing the factual background, the standard of review for grants of summary judgment, the Act's statute of limitations, and some of the case law developing the Martin/Van Dusen standard/ 51 the court of appeals began its analysis with its conclusion: "Williams had ample information during the limitations period that, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, should have led to the discovery of the malpractice she alleges."252 With that, the unanimous panel announced its reasoning: 
